In previous two-player experimental versions of the centipede game, the theoretically rational outcome has proven highly paradoxical. In this paper, I report on the findings of an experimental five player, high pay centipede game in a finite-repeated context over 60 rounds. The results show that additional players, and subsequently additional counterfactual conditions, do not necessarily lead to an increase in the Nash-equilibrium outcome. In the five player game, a large portion of the population were found to act as consistent cooperators, which had major effects on other subjects. Using a model of adaptive learning, previous game outcomes are shown to influence play over time. The significance of a lagged-historical based model at the first three decision nodes suggests a large amount of learning within the sessions. The combination of this adaptive play with cooperative types results in a significantly smaller move to Nash than found in an equivalent three player experimental treatment.
This thesis measures the degree of substitutability in consumption between televised mixed martial arts competition presented by the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) and professional wrestling presented by World Wrestling Entertainment (WWE) in order to estimate the potential impact on UFC’s revenues after WWE’s announcement of a change in its pay-per-view model that dramatically decreases prices. Using a variety of control variables, the seemingly unrelated regression model finds significant substitutability in consumption between the products offered by each company as well as decreasing revenues for UFC as time goes on. This thesis then analyzes WWE’s decision to offer a far less expensive digital subscription service and UFC’s decision to continue using the traditional pay-per-view model.
The prevalence of cooperation among appropriators in common-pool resources contradicts the predictions of the theory of collective action. Understanding the factors that affect the propensity for appropriators to cooperate will yield insights into the role of institutions and social norms in managing resources. An evolutionary game theory model is constructed to show the emergence and stability of a cooperative equilibrium subject to initial conditions. A logit regression model is used to determine the effect social, institutional, and physical variables have on the probability of a cooperative equilibrium emerging in irrigation systems in Nepal. The system location and type of management structure are found to affect the likelihood of cooperation and efficient use of the resource.
