In previous two-player experimental versions of the centipede game, the theoretically rational outcome has proven highly paradoxical. In this paper, I report on the findings of an experimental five player, high pay centipede game in a finite-repeated context over 60 rounds. The results show that additional players, and subsequently additional counterfactual conditions, do not necessarily lead to an increase in the Nash-equilibrium outcome. In the five player game, a large portion of the population were found to act as consistent cooperators, which had major effects on other subjects. Using a model of adaptive learning, previous game outcomes are shown to influence play over time. The significance of a lagged-historical based model at the first three decision nodes suggests a large amount of learning within the sessions. The combination of this adaptive play with cooperative types results in a significantly smaller move to Nash than found in an equivalent three player experimental treatment.
The author has given permission for this work to be deposited in the Digital Archive of Colorado College.
Includes bibliographical references.
Colorado College Honor Code upheld.
The author has given permission for this work to be deposited in the Digital Archive of Colorado College.
Colorado College Honor Code upheld.
